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INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO: LEGAL?
EFFECTIVE?
H.B. McCullough, Ph.D.*
A retrospective look at the 1999 war in Kosovo is in order. What Bishop
Butler called a "cool calm hour" is now upon us and we are well placed to make
some comments, however brief, on the authority and modalities of intervention
by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations in what
had formerly been an autonomous province of Serbia, and to make some
comments on efforts made in the aftermath of the intervention by way of
holding individuals accountable for atrocities committed.
The Kosovo war of 1999 must be seen against the background of the
disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a state
that had been severely affected by the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s.' The
precipitous recognition by Germany of both Slovenia and Croatia, coupled with
the subsequent recognition of these two states by western powers,2 virtually
guaranteed that the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina would explode and that the
region of Krajina in Croatia would erupt in violence and ethnic cleansing by
Croats of Serbs. Several factors in addition to the recognition contributed to the
turmoil in the former Yugoslavia, and these included the country's foreign debt
crisis, the absence of democratic institutions, fervent nationalism, and the
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1. See Michael MccGwire, Why Did We Bomb Belgrade, INT'L AFFAIRS, Jan. 1, 2000, at 2, for the
development of this line of thinking. For an extended discussion of the impact of the foreign debt crisis on
Yugoslavia, see SUSAN L WOoDwARD, THE BALKAN TRAGEDY ch. 3 (1995).
2. See the comments of Ivo Daalder that it was well understood by the United States that the
disintegration of Yugoslavia would probably be violent as well as his comment that "political settlement in
the former Yugoslavia was doomed by Germany's oft-repeated intention to recognize the independence of
Slovenia and Croatia unconditionally." See Ivo Daalder, Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENsIoNS OF INTERNAL CoNFIcr 50, 63 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996). See also the
comments of Stevan Lilic, University of Belgrade Law School and 1993 Visiting Researcher, University of
Pittsburgh, when he said "As argued by many experts on the matter, the premature recognition of certain
republics of the former Yugoslavia as independent states (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and Herzegovina)
was the cause of, or at least helped to create, the existing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in
Bosnia." See Stevan Ulic, Remarks on Yugoslavia: A Case Study of International Consequences of
Independence Movements, 87 ASILPROC 205, 213 (1993).
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absence of any regional solution to the problems developing in the SFRY.3
When Bosnia Herzegovina exploded in 1991-1992 tragedy ensued with Serbs
ethnically cleansing and seizing control of parts of the country and culminating
in the horrific events in Srebrenica in 1995 in which 7,000 Bosnian Muslims
were slaughtered by Serbs in a United Nations safe haven. In the same year the
Croatian army drove Serb forces from Krajina and compounded the misery by
cleansing the area of 200,000 Serbian inhabitants."
The failure to incorporate regional considerations into the Dayton Peace
Agreement of 1995, an agreement which resulted in the cessation of hostilities
in Bosnia Herzegovina, meant that Kosovo was left out of the equation. The
effect of this was that the frustration among Kosovar Albanians, which had been
building in Kosovo since 1989 when Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
pressured the Kosovo Assembly into abolishing the province's autonomous
status, simply increased. Kosovar Albanians who became progressively
disillusioned with the peaceful approach adopted by their leader Ibrahim
Rugova in dealing with Serbia, threw their support behind the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). This organization was, as Falk says, "dedicated to
waging an armed struggle to achieve an independent Kosovo" and by 1996 it
carried out "a variety of violent provocations that provided an ongoing pretext
and rationale for harsh Serb security measures. ' 5
From 1996 to 1999 hostilities tended to escalate between Serbians inside
and outside of Kosovar and Kosovar Albanians. Even with the presence of the
Kosovar Verification Mission (KVM) mandated by the United Nations and
headed by Ambassador William Walker, forty-five Kosovar Albanians were
massacred in Racak on January 15, 1999. This attack on alleged civilians was
'the final warning bell' and initiated considerable political activity in European
capitals and in Washington. The upshot was the convening of talks in France
at Chateau Rambouillet under the auspices of the Contact Group. The terms of
the agreement struck at Rambouillet were, it appears, excessive as made evident
by Appendix B, article 8 which gave NATO unimpeded access throughout the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In the event, the exaggerated
conditions of the drafted agreement meant that a dark shadow was cast over the
line of authority pursued by NATO in justifying its subsequent military
intervention. It therefore seems unsurprising that the FRY delegation did not
agree to the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement. On March 18, 1999, the talks,
having shifted to the Kleber Centre in Paris, were suspended when the Serbian
3. For an excellent discussion of these and other points, see WOODWARD, supra note 1.
4. According to MccGwire, "The Croatian modus operandi was so effective that the Serbs adopted
the same approach when they occupied Kosovo in March 1999." See MccGwire, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Richard Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L
847, 849 (1999).
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delegation "refuse[d] to budge."6 On March 19, the KVM withdrew from
Kosovo and on March 20, Yugoslav armed units launched an offensive against
the Kosovar Albanians. Finally, on March 24, NATO airstrikes began.
So much for a brief historic background to NATO intervention in Kosovo.
What line of authority is there to support this intervention? And what
modalities did NATO use to intervene in Kosovo?
The starting point of this discussion is the United Nations Charter.
NATO's own North Atlantic Treaty turns us towards this document for it says
in its Preamble: the Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter and their desire to live in peace with
all peoples and all governments. More needs to be said later about NATO, its
treaty, and the Charter. For the moment it suffices simply to hold the Charter
front and center in any discussion of NATO's authority for military engagement
in Kosovo.
Under the Charter there are only two permissible uses of force in
international relations, both found in Chapter VII, Article 51. The first is
enforcement action by the Security Council aimed at maintaining international
peace and security, and the second is self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations. The second of these justifications
cannot function as a rationale for NATO involvement in Kosovo,7 and therefore
only the first remains as a way of making right the conduct of NATO.
Even allowing that the purposes of the United Nations as given in the
Charter include not only maintaining peace and security but also achieving
international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights,8 they do not provide a wedge for legalizing NATO's unilateral action in
Kosovo. The reason for saying this lies in Article 2(4) which prohibits threats
6. See Kosovo Chronology, available at http:llwww.state.gov/www/regionsleur/
fs_kosovo timeline.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
7. Article 51 reads in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Clearly,
NATO was not under attack and so it could not claim self-defense. Moreover, Kosovo was not a member of
the United Nations and so the Province of Kosovo could not claim a right of self-defense under Article 51.
Here, I take issue with the suggestion of Ruth Wedgwood that, in the context of Article 51, "surely self-
defense of a population warrants as much consideration as defense of a political structure." See Ruth
Wedgwood, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. IN'L L 828, 833
(1999). Clearly, Article 51 applies only to the juidical state.
8. To concede this is to concede a lot, for as Charney has persuasively argued, though protection
of human rights is among the purposes of the United Nations Charter, it is "subsidiary to the objective of
limiting war and the use of force in international relations, as found in the express Charter prohibitions on the
use of force. This interpretation is supported by the travauxpreparatoires of the Charter." See Jonathan 1.
Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834, 835 (1999). Chamey's view would
seem to support the view that Article 1 (1) dominates Article 1 (3), i.e. that the objectives of peace and security
dominate the objective of human rights.
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or the use of force by any members against the "territorial integrity or political
independence of any state," and in Article 2(7) which prohibits United Nations
intervention in matters which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state." Article 2(4) itself would seem to render illegal any unilateral
action by any member state, acting alone or in concert with some other member
states without the blessings of the Security Council, against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state. This would imply that NATO's
military actions in Kosovo were illegal. And while Article 2(7) might well
allow for United Nations intervention inside a state on the grounds that human
rights violations are not solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, this does
nothing to justify unilateral NATO action, action which was undertaken without
the blessings of the Security Council. And although Article 52 states that
nothing in the Charter precludes regional arrangements for peace and security,
these arrangements and activities must be "consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations." This means that Article 52 has to be read
alongside of the "territorial integrity" provision of Article 2(4). And this would
seem sufficient to make unilateral action by NATO in Kosovo illegal. 9
Furthermore, Article 53 of the Charter does not afford a legal justification
for NATO' s intervention in Kosovo. First of all, though the article provides that
the Security Council shall utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action
under its authority, it also provides that no enforcement action shall be taken
without the authorization of the Security Council. So even if NATO were a
regional organization, the absence of any Security Council authorization for
NATO intervention is sufficient to remove its legal justification in the case of
Kosovo. But, as Bruno Simma has argued successfully, NATO is not a regional
organization but an international one.' ° In the result the requirement found in
Article 53 is not 'formally applicable' to NATO.
Against the foregoing, it is difficult to see any authority based on the
Charter for NATO military intervention in Kosovo. This is a conclusion that is
9. Something should be said here about Article 24 of the Charter. This article confers on the
Security council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The
secondary responsibility impliedly referred to here applies, it would seem, to regional arrangements already
discussed, which are in turn subject to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations including Article 2
(4), the territorial integrity provision. It would seem, therefore, that the effect of Article 24 is not to spawn
other agencies which can maintain peace and security independently of the Security Council, but to structure
the process of conflict resolution so that regional agencies attempt pacific settlements "before referring them
to the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 25, available at htp://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww
/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ ibasicunchart.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). There is nothing in any of this
which implies that by conjoining Article 24 with Article 52 that regional agencies such as NATO have a legal
right to initiate unilateral intervention.
10. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use ofLegal Force: Legal Aspects, EUR. J. INT'LL
10(1999). Suggestions in conversation by Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell encouraged me to reconsider this
aspect of the Charter and the relevance of it to the Kosovo conflict.
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not eroded by three resolutions passed by the Security Council under Chapter
VII prior to NATO's bombing campaign or by one resolution passed after the
cessation of hostilities. Here, I am referring to Resolution 1160 (March 1998),
Resolution 1199 (September 1998), Resolution 1203 (October 1998) and
Resolution 1244 (June 1999)." None of these resolutions authorized NATO
bombing, nor "retroactively legalized" them. The Council for its part, in
addition to passing three resolutions to reign-in the FRY prior to the bombing
and one resolution to authorize a peace mission after the cessation of bombing,
on the third day of the bombing refused to condemn NATO bombing. By a vote
of 12-3, the resolution proposed by Russia, India, and Belarus charging that
NATO in its bombings violated Articles 2(4), 24, and 53 of the Charter, failed.
And the Secretary-General, finding himself in the unenviable position of
attempting to make credible the organization he headed notwithstanding its
inaction when faced with a humanitarian catastrophe, went on to assert that it
was tragic that diplomacy had failed but there are times when the use of force
"may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace."' 2 Regrettably, scour though we do
these collective resolutions of the Security Council and the comments of the
Secretary-General, there is nothing which legalizes and thereby authorizes
NATO's military intervention in Kosovo.
Some might be tempted to think that, regardless of the foregoing, the
international legal system has changed owing to the erosion of state sovereignty
and that this erosion is predicated on the growth of human rights, environmental
concerns, and globalization. Those so thinking might conclude that there is no
real legal impediment to NATO-like intervention in so-called sovereign states
in defense of human rights. To this it seems fair to say that while state
sovereignty may have experienced some diminution, those who make this claim
tend to overplay their hand. Geoffrey Garrett has argued convincingly that the
policy constraints on governments generated by global trade,
multinationalization of production and the internationalization of financial
markets are "weaker and less pervasive than is often presumed."' 3 Moreover
whatever erosion of state sovereignty that might have occurred it is difficult to
11. These resolutions dealt with, respectively: the imposition of an arms ban on the FRY and the
withdrawal of special police units, the cessation of the use of force and the violation of human rights, the
authorization of an observer force called the KVM, and authorization of an international civilian and security
presence after the cessation of the war. Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 833; Chamey, supra note 8, at 835;
Kosovo: A Human Tragedy: United Nations Efforts Aim to Alleviate Suffering of180,00, U.N. CHRONICLE,
Jan. 1, 1999, at 5.
12. Id Later before the General Assembly he added "the imperative of effectively halting gross and
systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences" is an "equally compelling
interest." Press Release, United Nations, Secretary General Presents His Annual Report to the General
Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
13. Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?,
52 INT'L ORG. 787, 805 (1998).
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see a consensus emerging at the international level authorizing this kind of
intervention. The absence of widespread state practice and opiniojuris as well
as the condemnation of the General Assembly of specific interventions, e.g.,
India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 to protect Bengalis, make clear that
such consensus does not now exist. In addition, it seems that important
international players such as Russia and China, and possibly some NATO
countries as well, 14 would oppose a development of international law in such a
direction. One may fairly conclude from this that no new general law or
customary law of intervention has emerged nor is likely to in the near future.'5
The legality of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo aside, what can
be said of the modalities of NATO's involvement? The modalities of this
military involvement included initially the use of "smart weaponry" which was
"confined to military targets,"" but when this failed to produce the desired
results NATO extended its targets. This resulted in damage to manufacture
enterprises, power supply, transportation facilities, agriculture and forestry,
water management, construction industries, trade, catering, and banks.'7 Over
27,000 sorties'8 (including sorties of B-52s) were flown and 23,000 bombs
(including cluster bombs and depleted uranium ordnance) and missiles, 35%
being smart weapons,' 9 were dropped. It is believed that a quarter of the SAM
radar sites were destroyed and there have been reports of "significant collateral
damage to civilian facilities including two hospitals and several schools."' The
dollar value of the total damage is estimated by European Union officials to be
in the neighborhood of United States $30 billion and by Yugoslav officials to
be between United States $30 and 100 billion.2'
I want now to pass on to consider a different aspect of the war in Kosovo.
Previously I focused on the authority, if any, NATO had in intervening in what
was otherwise an internal conflict. In what follows, I wish to look at the efforts
made to bring about peace and security in Kosovo as well as the efforts to
secure accountability for the atrocities the intervention intended to end.
14. Germany would probably oppose such development. See the comments on Germany's
reluctance to make NATO's decision to intervene a precedent in Bruno. Simma, supra note 10, at 13.
15. This does not augur well for what I call the Blair Doctrine: acts of genocide can never be a
purely internal matter, and reform of the Security Council needs to reflect the "propriety of intervention to stop
genocide." See Michael J. Glennon, The Charter: Does It Fit?, U.N. CHRONICLE, Jan. 1, 1999, at 33.
16. Falk, supra note 5, at 851.
17. Economic, Humanitarian and Ecological Consequences of NATO Aggression against
Yugoslavia - Basic Facts and Appraisals, 40 YUGOSLAV SURV. 9, 10 (1999).
18. See also MccGwire, supra note 1, at 10.
19. See Martin L Cook, Immaculate War: Constraints on Humanitarian Intervention, 14 ETHICS
& INr'L AFF. 55, 64 (2000).
20. See McGwire, supra note I, at 11.
21. Economic, Humanitarian and Ecological Consequences of NATO Aggression Against
Yugoslavia - Basic Facts and Appraisals, supra note 17.
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On June 3, 1999, a peace plan was brokered which was expanded on a
week later in United Nations Resolution 1244. This resolution included three
principles: 1) the deployment of an international security and civil presence
(KFOR) in Kosovo under United Nations rather than NATO auspices; 2) the
omission of any reference to KFOR's right to unrestricted passage and
unimpeded access to Serbia; and 3) the omission of any reference to a
referendum to decide Kosovo's future. More now needs to be said about the
first of these points.
Security Council Resolution 1244 provided for the presence of 50,000
KFOR international troops. Their deployment has for the most part met with
success, for it has brought peace and a measure of security. But it has faced and
continues to face difficulties. Retaliation by Albanian Kosovars against Serbs
and Gypsies has been an issue with which KFOR has had to contend. Some
have claimed that this has "made a mockery of any attempt to build a multi-
ethnic Kosovo."2 There is still concern that extremists, called the Liberation
Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), are "bent on stirring up
trouble in southern Serbia."23 In addition, there has been considerable
displacement of Serbs from Kosovo; "it appears that well over 164,000 Serbs
fled Kosovo since early June [1999]."'24 Perhaps the condemnation on August
4, 2000 by the Interim Administrative Council for Kosovo of the recent spate
of violence there2" is sufficient to make clear that what exists in Kosovo is an
uneasy peace and incomplete security. That this is still very much a problem
was made evident in an open meeting between Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the head
of UNMIK, and the Security Council. There he said on September 27, 2000
that the situation of non-Albanian communities is the biggest problem in
Kosovo. He maintained "Serbs and Roma, in particular are often still excluded
from daily life and are under great personal security risks." 2' Unease and
apprehension remain in Kosovo notwithstanding the very great efforts of KFOR
and UNMIK to make the situation better.' The issue of peace and security now
22. Michael Gove, Only Now Can We See How We Lost In Kosovo, TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 2000,
at 22.
23. Ed Vulliamy & Helena Smith, US Faces Rebel War in Kosovo: Pentagon Bracedfor Bloodshed
After Raids on Guerillas, OBSERVER, Mar. 19, 2000, at 22.
24. Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, Human Rights Watch 81 (1998).
25. Kosovo News, available at hnp:/www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kostor.htm (last visited Mar.
17,2001).
26. Complete Kosovo Coverage, available at http://www.un.org/peacekosovofnews/99/kosarc.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
27. It is obvious why this unease and apprehension should remain. Sher has remarked "There have
been more than 330 serious ethnic crimes in Kosovo since January 2000, two-thirds committed by ethnic
Albanians against Serbs and other minorities." Julian Sher. Ethnic Albanians Use Web in Fight Against Serb
Control, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 12, 2000, at A14.
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treated, I should like to turn attention to the issue of justice and the role of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was unanimously adopted on May 25, 1993 through
Resolution 827 of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. The Tribunal's statute conferred jurisdiction of subject matter
over the following crimes: Article 2: Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, Article 3: Violations of the Laws or Customs of War,
Article 4: Genocide, and Article 5: Crimes Against Humanity. According to
Article 8, the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTY shall extend to the territory of
the former Yugoslavia and apply to actions carried out since January 1,1991.
National courts and the ICTY are to have, according to Article 9, concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international
humanitarian law, though according to Article 9(2) the Tribunal shall have
primacy over national courts.
Resolution 827 established the ICTY. The legal issues surrounding the
authority of this tribunal are the following: 1) does the Security Council have
authority to establish tribunals?; and 2) even if the ICTY has authority over
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia as it applies to the independent
republics which have exercised their right to self-determination under the
Constitution of the SFRY, does the ICTY have authority over humanitarian law
inside Serbia, i.e. inside Kosovo? The answer to the first of these questions is
generally thought positive.2 The second question is more problematic not
because the terms of the Statute of the ICTY leaves any doubt about its
authority, but because the ICTY has justified its authority to try individuals in
Bosnia Herzegovina on the grounds that Serbia enforced the Dayton Agreement
of 1995.29 And clearly the Dayton Agreement has nothing to do with the
Kosovo war apart from contributing to its development.
But there is no need to predicate the Tribunal's authority in the former
Yugoslavia on the Dayton Agreement for it can be predicated on Security
28. There are issues worth discussing here. As Bodley points out, "Chapter VII makes no explicit
provision for the establishment of international tribunals. A literal reading of the Chapter permits the
conclusion, therefore, that the Security Council was acting ultra vires in creating the International Tribunal.
This was precisely the argument put forward by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
against its establishment." See Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 417,428 (1999).
But it would appear that the Security Council did act within its mandate by satisfying Article 39 of the Charter
"in determining that the international humanitarian law violations in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat
to peace and security. It then properly invoked Article 41 to employ measures short of the use of armed force
in attempting to restore international peace and security." Id. at 440.
29. Bodley points out that in its 1996 submission to the United Nations Yearbook, the ICTY said:
"By signing the [Dayton] Accord, the parties thereto, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) ... have formally recognized the Tribunal .... " Id. at 449.
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Council Resolution 827. In this way the problem of the authority of the ICTY
in Kosovo vanishes which it does not do if the Dayton Agreement is relied
upon. This agreement was meant to apply to problems in Bosnia Herzegovina.
It has no bearing on Kosovo and certainly does not give authority over
humanitarian law to the ICTY in Kosovo. What gives authority to the ICTY is
Security Council Resolution 827.
As indicated above, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia gives the tribunal jurisdiction of subject matter over
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of
war, genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the distinction in
international law between international and non-international (internal) armed
conflicts3" means that some of these have application in Kosovo and some do
not. The Kosovo war was an internal armed conflict: internal because it took
place in an autonomous or formerly autonomous province of Serbia 31 and armed
because it was so declared by the ICTY on July 7, 1998.32 Therefore, the
Tribunal's jurisdictional subject matter in Kosovo is limited to crimes
committed in an internal armed conflict. Accordingly, grave breaches of the
30. See the comment made by Human Rights Watch, "International humanitarian law makes a
critical distinction between international and non-international (internal) armed conflicts, and a proper
characterization of the conflict is important to determine which aspects of international humanitarian law
apply." Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, supra note 24.
31. Whatever its status, Kosovo was not a republic and did not have a constitutional right to self-
determination, a right possessed by all the republics until 1994. The 1946 Constitution of the Federal Peoples
Republic of Yugoslavia in Article I. says "The Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's
state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-
determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state."
CONsTrrTrrIONS OF NATIONS 522 (Vol. 11 1950). See also The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles No. I, "he nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the rights of every nation
to self-determination, including the right to secession ...." See also Article I which reads, "The Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united
nations and their Socialist Republics." The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; The
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, available at http://www.uni-
wuerzburg.de/law/sr000O_.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001). See also Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia 1994, which says nothing at all about the right of nations to self-determination. CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD Vol. XX (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 2000). What these
suggest is that republics in the form of nations, not nationalities, had the right to self-determination until 1994.
For a discussion of the national question in Yugoslavia, see Banac's seminal work, Ivo BANAC, THE
NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1984), especially Part VI. It
should be pointed that he does not seem to preserve the distinctions which the various constitutions make
between "nation" and "nationality."
32. Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, supra note 24, at 89. This is important because the
ICTY Statute says that the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons for crimes committed in armed
conflict, whether the conflict is international or internal.
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Geneva Conventions are not within the purview of the Tribunal in Kosovo for
such breaches presuppose an international conflict.3
3
It is, however, within the purview of the Tribunal to prosecute cases arising
from the Kosovo war based on Article 3: Violations of the laws or customs of
war, Article 4: genocide, and Article 5: crimes against humanity. In the matter
of violations of the laws or customs of war, the Tribunal could turn to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which is really a convention
within a convention, and could turn to Protocol II which supplements Common
Article 3.' In the matter of genocide, the Tribunal could in turn assert that
"customary law establishes universal jurisdiction over genocide"35 and maintain
that the International Court of Justice has claimed that the principles behind the
Genocide Convention "are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States,
even without any conventional obligation. 36 And in the matter of crimes
against humanity, the Tribunal could confidently maintain that since
Nuremberg, crimes against humanity have been universally enforceable against
authorities inside the state in which they were committed. So notwithstanding
the internal nature of the Kosovo armed conflict, the Tribunal has three arrows
in its quiver.
It is from this quiver that on May 22, 1999 Louise Arbour Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal pulled out two arrows and, pursuant to her
authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the Tribunal, charged Slobodan
Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajiko
Stojiljkovic with crimes against humAnity and violations of the laws or customs
33. A similar point in a different context is made by two commentators. In discussing Tadic, they
have remarked, "In order for grave breaches to have been committed, the conflict in the Prijedor region would
have to be characterized as an international armed conflict." See Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson,
International Decision: Prosecutor v. Tadic, 94 AM. J. INT'L L 571, 572 (2000).
34. Common Article 3 is the only part of the Geneva Convention that applies to internal armed
conflicts. This article protects persons who take no active part in the hostilities and expressly prohibits
violence to ife and person; in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages;
outrages upon personal dignity; and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without proper
judicial involvement. Protocol U, which also applies to internal armed conflict, prohibits the following:
orders that there shall be no survivors; acts of violence against all persons captured; torture; pillage and
destruction of civilian property; and the desecration of corpses.
35. See Diane F. Ortentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2565 (1991). It is crucial that jurisdiction be rooted in some
customary law basis since the Genocide Convention, Article VI claims that persons charged with genocide
shall be tried in the state in which they have committed the act or by an international tribunal which has its
jurisdiction accepted by the contracting parties. The FRY has not accepted the ICTY's jurisdiction in Kosovo.
This would mean that acts of genocide could only be tried in the FRY, hardly an acceptable position for either
the Kosovar Albanians or the United Nations.
36. Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idecisions/isummaries/ippcgsummary5lO528.htn (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
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of war.37 Four counts were brought against these individuals. Three of these
were for crimes against humanity including deportation, murder, and
persecutions. One of these was for a violation of the laws or customs of war,
namely murder. To date, there have been no convictions in this case. Indeed,
down to March 21, 2000, very little had happened by way of indicting persons
for violations of humanitarian law in connection with the Kosovo conflict. Of
the thirty-seven indictments against individuals by the ICTY, only one of these
had any connection with Kosovo.
It seems that in response to a perceived need to handle more cases related
to war and ethnic crimes in Kosovo, by way of supplementing the work done
by the ICTY, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo headed by Dr. Bernard
Kouchner decided in the spring of 2000 to "create an internationally run court
to try war and ethnic crimes in the province."38 The new court, called the
Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court, was to be a specialized agency with
"precedence over local courts" and would have a mandate to cover war crimes
committed by Serbs during the war and to try Albanians for abductions and
killings of Serbs after and during the war. The Court was to be comprised of an
international judge, an ethnic Albanian, and a Serb.39 It appears however that
up to the present, nothing has come of Dr. Kouchner' s suggestion. Nothing is
said of it in UNMIK Regulations for 2000,40 and this would imply the Court has
yet to be established.
Although the above suggests a slow start to prosecution of war crimes in
Kosovo, with most attention given to the "big fish" (Milosevic et al), some
attention is now being given to the "small fry." The approach UNMIK is now
taking in this matter is trying individuals for war crimes in district courts with
internationally appointed prosecutors. Evidence for this is found in the
commencement of a trial, of a man charged with committing acts of genocide,
in Mitrovica district court with the international prosecutor Michael Hartmann.4'
In trying an individual for this offense, the court reached into the quiver referred
37. The Prosecutor of the TribunalAgainst Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic,
Dragoljub Ojdanic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, at http://www.un.orglicty/indictrnentl english/mil-ii990524e.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001). The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The charges filed
in this case relate to events in Racak, Bela Crkva, Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde - Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel,
Dakovica/Gjakove, CrkolezPadalishte, lzbica, and (for a second time) Dakovica/Gjakove. Only the events
in Racak on January 15, 1999, occurred prior to the bombing on March 24, 1999.
38. Carlotta Gall, U.N. Mission in Kosovo Proposes to Set Up a War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2000, at A3.
39. Alexandra Poolos, Kosovo: War Crimes Court to Be Established, at http://www.rferl.org/
nca/features/2000/04/F.RU.000427133027.htmI (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
40. See UNMIK Regulations, available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/
regulations/regs.html. (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
41. UN Mission In Kosovo, at http://www.un.org/peacekosovo/news/kostor.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2000).
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to above and pulled out the third arrow, the crime of genocide.42 By early
September, 2000, UNMIK had appointed three prosecutors (Hartmann of
Germany, Garland of the United Kingdom, and one other) and seven
international judges (including Ingo Risch of Germany)43 in Kosovo." In
addition, a two-day seminar organized by the Kosovo Judicial Institute (run by
OSCE) took place in Pristina on September 5, 2000 to introduce Kosovo
judiciary to international humanitarian law.45 On August 10, 2000, UNMIK
appointed 139 local judges and prosecutors bringing the total to 405.4 And on
September 5, 2000, UNMIK dismissed the director of the Mitrovica Detention
Center from which fifteen Kosovo Serbs, most charged with war crimes,
escaped. What all of this suggests is that UNMIK is attempting to use
domestic courts topped up with a few international judges and prosecutors to
facilitate the prosecution of cases dealing with humanitarian law.48 In this way,
the action of UNMIK to utilize domestic courts for the prosecution of war
crimes complements the work of the ICTY.
The foregoing has explored two different kinds of intervention by the
international community in Kosovo, first military intervention by NATO and
secondly legal intervention in the form of the ICTY. The first was judged by
me to be illegal and the second legal. As for the effectiveness of these two
forms of intervention, one may say the following.49
It appears that over the short-run NATO achieved what it wanted in
Kosovo: it stopped the displacement of persons, rapes and atrocities.
Accordingly, it appears as if NATO intervention was effective. However, this
might be a less compelling virtue than first meets the eye. If, for instance, it
42. Other events in Kosovo under UNMIK have occurred recently that reflect on a changingjudicial
environment there. Dr. Bernard Kouchner has recently announced the appointment of an additional 139
judges and prosecutors and 309 lay judges "as part of his effort to improve the functioning of the judicial
system in Kosovo." See Kosovo News, at http://www.un.org/ peace/kosovo/news/kostor.htm. (last visited
Mar. 17, 2001).
43. See id
44. Kosovo Swears In New International Prosecutor and Judge, at http://www.un.orgt
peacelkosovolnews/99/sepOO.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
45. See Kosovo News, supra note 42. The focus of the seminar was on the legal concepts of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and individual criminal responsibility. UN Mission Rejects
Belgrade-Organized Elections in Kosovo as "Farce", at http://www.un.org/peace/
kosovo/news/99/sepO0_ .htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
46. Kosovo Swears in New International Prosecutor and Judge, supra note 44.
47. UN in Kosovo Dismisses Director of Detention Centre Following Escape of Prisoners, at
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
48. Cases pertaining to humanitarian law are coming before the domestic courts of Kosovo. See
Kosovo Hosts Seminar On International Humanitarian Law, at http://www.un.org/
peace/kosovolnews99/sep00jl.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
49. The effectiveness of United Nations intervention in Kosovo is a separate topic to be treated on
another occasion.
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could be shown that the Serbian attack on Kosovo was intended as a pre-
emptive strike in anticipation of NATO bombing, especially in light of the
Rambouillet Agreement, then NATO intervention would turn out to be effective
in bringing to a close the very actions it helped cause. So the virtue of
effectiveness might turn out to be gratuitous and hardly deserving of praise.
Preliminary evidence suggests, however, that this interpretation of events is
incorrect. Serbian practice in Bosnia provides inductive support for the
proposition that Serbian forces were capable of committing atrocities without
being under the threat of NATO bombing. But admittedly the evidence is
incomplete with respect to Kosovo and one will not know with certainty the
answer to the counterfactual-what the Serbians would have done in Kosovo
if NATO had not threatened bombing-until archival records are examined in
Belgrade in future years. The evidence that one does have suggests that this
counterfactual would be answered: the Serbians would have done exactly what
they did though on an even larger scale. With this in mind the effectiveness of
NATO intervention can be provisionally asserted.
One may also say that over the short-run the ICTY did not achieve very
much apart from the indictment of Milosevic and his associates. In the result
and taking into consideration only what has thus far transpired, the military
intervention has proven to be illegal but effective, while the legal intervention
has proven to be legal but ineffective. With these in mind, I wish to conclude
with a consideration of two residual issues.
First, in assessing NATO's intervention, arguably unilateral intervention
in Kosovo,5° one cannot help but be struck by the dissonance between NATO's
actions and the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty which reads: the Parties
to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter and their desire to live in peace with all the peoples and
governments. And one cannot help but be struck by the dissonance between
NATO's actions and Article 7 of the Treaty which states: "This Treaty does not
affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and
obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security."'" It is worth noting that,
though western writers made virtually nothing of it, this dissonance was noted
50. Wedgwood takes issue with the claim that NATO's actions were unilateral when she alleges that
NATO is "close to an objective regime." She reasons "NATO's decision deserves greater deference than
purely unilateral action." Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 833. It is difficult to see how this line of reasoning
would not have applied to the Warsaw Pact when it acted in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.
51. Escor REID, 1iME oF FEAR AND HOPE app. 2 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).
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separately first by Yugoslav authorities and then by France at the NATO fiftieth
anniversary in Washington in April 1999.52
Secondly, given the illegality of NATO's actions, is there room for the
argument that its actions were nonetheless justified on moral grounds, say on
grounds ofjustice? Those answering in the affirmative would presumably argue
that NATO had to intervene to prevent another Bosnia and to prevent regional
instability. 53 Since there was deadlock in the Security Council, no relief could
be expected from that quarter and the result was that NATO was the only game
in town. Therefore, NATO action was morally justified. But this argument is
persuasive only if a capacious utilitarianism or far-sighted consequentialism is
employed to measure the long-term effects of NATO action. Setting aside
lingering doubts concerning NATO action in the first place, objections turning
on the severity of the Rambouillet Agreement and on the premature withdrawal
of KVM personnel, a capacious utilitarianism would demand that any moral
assessment of NATO's actions be forward-looking and directed at the
commitments of the United Nations and KFOR to Kosovo in the future. What
I am suggesting here is that a moral assessment of NATO's actions requires a
careful analysis not only of what harm it prevented in the short run but of what
harm it prevents in the long run.
Relevant to the foregoing observation are the following comments of two
military figures with experience in the Balkans. The remark of retired Admiral
Leighton W. Smith Jr. who commanded the NATO forces in Bosnia in 1996 is
in order. He said in the spring of 2000 "I don't think we are going to get out of
Kosovo for a while unless we are willing to allow the Kosovar Albanians to
declare independence and take over Kosovo in its entirety and run all the Serbs
out, and then forment trouble in Macedonian which I am convinced they will
do." '54 And the former supreme commander in NATO in Europe, General
Wesley Clark, said while talking generally of the NATO mission in the Balkans,
"But that mission requires a vital political component, a long-term strategy for
the region." 55 So if the effect of NATO's intervention is to set the stage for an
apologetically and rhetorically clothed exit that results in more civil strife,
regional instability and ethnic cleansing, the moral argument from justice seems
paper thin.
52. See International Law and Order and NATO Aggression Against Yugoslavia, in 40 YUGOSLAV
SuRV. 5 (1999); Richard Caplan, Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward?, 14 ETHics AND Nrr'L
AFF. 23, 31 (2000).
53. At least for NATO supporters, it is important that there be a conjunction of reasons here to block
critics of NATO from saying the West's indifference to the tragedy in Rwanda in which 800,000 people
perished is evidence of racism.
54. George C. Wilson, Kosovo Has Been Hard on NATO, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 21, 2000, at
6.
55. Preparing to Step Down, Clark Warns NATO Needs New Strategy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr.
28, 2000, at 12.
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A capacious utilitarianism requires something quite different to make
acceptable the interventionist argument on moral grounds. What it requires is
a long-term commitment, or at least the willingness for a long-term
commitment, from the United Nations and KFOR and possibly NATO for peace
and security in Kosovo. Those who shun this and wish to exit in a moment of
triumphalism grounding their convictions on justice are in effect echoing the
views of the deontological tradition in ethics, a tradition which emphasizes non-
negotiables like truth, promise-keeping, and justice. The high-minded who are
fond of rights-talk probably fall well within this tradition. But there remains the
utilitarian tradition of Hume, Bentham and John Mill and J.S. Mill, and this
tradition looks at things in terms of where they might lead. It is this tradition
which I am suggesting needs once again to be heard in the case of Kosovo. A
capacious utilitarianism or far-sighted consequentialism would hold off
delivering its final moral judgment of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, waiting
to see where NATO and KFOR go from here.
